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SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE WORKPLACE: PRIVATE REGULATION OF SPEECH 
 David Mangan
*
 
A developing line of case law suggests there is little space for workers’ remarks on social 
media platforms even before discussion of employers’ proportionate responses. Workers are 
being disciplined (up to and including termination) for online remarks because employment 
contract clauses have vested employers with a unilateral authority to assess workers’ online 
speech based on the expansive threshold of what may be embarrassing to or what may lower 
business reputation. While a legitimate concern itself, the singular focus on business 
reputation fosters a chilling effect at a time of unprecedented facilities for individual free 
speech. A comparison of United Kingdom and Canadian cases on social media in the 
workplace offers an instructive contrast where, in Canada, there is greater scope for 
expression than in the UK. While the Canadian decisions lead to fertile discussion of 
pressing social issues, they are not idealized. Rulings in both countries remain susceptible to 
further difficulties, such as the capacity for information technology to expose workers and 
employers alike to legal risk beyond the ‘work day’.  
 
Keywords: information technology, workplace, business reputation, United Kingdom, 
Canada 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Information technology offers an unprecedented capacity for individual expression. It also 
provides for widespread monitoring of these remarks by employers, co-workers and the 
public. The freedom to express online is notably constrained by the contract of employment 
for anyone falling under the heading of ‘worker’. The breadth and strength of contract clauses 
(and, if incorporated, workplace policies or handbooks) regarding social media use can be 
seen in how these provisions vest employers with wide discretion to determine whether 
remarks reflect negatively on the undertaking’s business reputation. This situation warrants 
further consideration. Free speech remains a championed value in many countries; a 
touchstone of modern democracy and protected in law.
1
 Still, the perceived value of free 
speech does not appear to permeate the personal work relationship. There is an imperative to 
which this study is directed. As this is a formative period for information technology and the 
workplace, the present is an occasion to carefully consider the intersection. Once parameters 
are firmly set, they are more difficult to amend.  
The jurisdictions under study here are United Kingdom and Canadian 
employment/labor litigation when remarks on social media have been the basis for worker 
discipline up to and including dismissal. While comparative analysis enhances the study of 
law and information technology,
2
 the workplace additionally offers a valuable setting from 
which to observe the differing perspectives on the balancing of interests. These two 
jurisdictions have some important similarities:
3
 they are both democratic, common law,
4
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 Largely secular and West-centered: W. Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global 
Perspective (CUP 2009), 6. 
2
 A. R. Lodder, “Ten Commandments of Internet Law Revisited: Basic Rules for Internet Lawyers” (2013) 22 
I.C.T.L. 264, 268. 
3
 The comparison also continues that employed by UK academic labor law commentators; for example, D. 
Brodie, “Voice and the Employment Contract” in A. Bogg and T. Novitz (eds), Voices at Work: Continuity and 
Change in the Common Law World (OUP 2014), 337.   
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highly-developed jurisdictions where economic interests and free speech are stated values. 
The paradigmatic quality of economic stimulation through employment regulation forms an 
important context for this discussion. There is also a noteworthy contrast in labor 
adjudication between these two countries where Canada has, since the turn of the 21
st
 
century, been more willing to recognize labor rights as compared to the more restrained UK 
approach.
5
 A similar assessment can be made of the respective approaches to social media 
and the workplace. Business reputation is the concept at the center of the difference between 
the jurisdictions. 
Decisions in this area offer a further point of interest: how do employers find out 
about these remarks? In some instances, employers are notified of online remarks by other 
workers or even members of the public. In others, employers have come across the remarks; 
seemingly through internet searches but it is not clear if this is by way of a decision to 
monitor workers or incidental to general internet searches. The reasons for the information 
coming to employers’ attention casually bypass the question of whether or not there has been 
an intrusion into workers’ privacy rights. Consequently, the topic has not been engaged as 
extensively as freedom of expression. Instead, the underlying notion is that if comments are 
made on social media then any privacy right has been automatically abandoned. This is a 
debatable premise regarding the privacy interests of workers.
6
 The supposition relies on the 
assertion that all comments made online are public;
7
 ignoring the possibility of privacy 
settings (for example) or more directed communication to a select audience.  
Decisions have focused on expression by workers on social media platforms and as a 
result there has been a conflation of reputation and insubordination. Employers discipline 
workers for these online postings because of the potential negative effect on their business 
reputation. Adjudication of the issue is influenced by defamation through inferentially 
adopting the distinction made in the tort that published words pose greater potential for harm, 
in this case, to business reputation. The impugned conduct in these cases can be classified as 
insubordination which is most often set out in the failure of the workers to abide by a 
contractual clause (or workplace policy) relating to conduct in the online environment. 
However, not all of these remarks should fall under this classification because some are 
tantamount to the venting of frustrations co-workers may have (and certainly had) when 
meeting in the same physical location to verbally talk amongst themselves. Posting a remark 
about a frustration at work can be viewed as violating a contract clause and yet the remark is 
one that the same worker may say to colleagues at an after work gathering without a similar 
result. The difference lies in the form (a posting which is a publication) and the consequential 
potential impact on business reputation. One may wander by a table of disgruntled workers of 
                                                                                                                                                        
4
 Canadian common law is largely derived from the UK and continues to borrow from it. This is not to say all 
Canadian law is strictly adherent. Canadian law diverged from UK tort law with the retention of Lord 
Wilberforce’s duty of care analysis in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1977] 2 All E.R. 492 by the 
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5
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6
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one employer, hear similar comments to those posted, and complain about them. 
Employment litigation is not as immersed in these types of cases as it is with instances of 
remarks on social media platforms.  
Overlapping with defamation prompts additional discussion of disconnect between 
citizens’ and workers’ free speech. This requires further reflection because statutory and 
common law developments pertaining to defamation, in the jurisdictions under study, have 
expanded protection of free speech. Drawing from these changes, this investigation reflects 
on the permeability of free speech as a celebrated right in democracy against the stricter view 
held in employment decisions. In effect, employers are akin to gatekeepers with regards to 
expression of their workers on social media platforms. The prima facie freedom of speech, 
before there is discussion of a proportionate response,
8
 remains an area for further important 
examination; that is, questioning whether there should be discipline for all social media 
remarks by workers. There has been an accepted spectrum for remarks where political speech 
has a prominent place.
9
 However, the scope should be more broadly construed in light of 
developments in information technology, thereby compelling reconsideration of what may be 
viewed as ‘unimportant speech’ when it leads to discipline of workers for social media 
remarks. The larger question is why there continues to be a penchant for removing the 
humanity from the one of the most human of legal disciplines, labor/employment. Social 
media in the workplace recalls that, even in this contemporary context, the tools of contract 
and tort reinforce the roots of industrial law.
10
 
Protection of business interests remain a legitimate aim
11
 and social media issues 
connected to the workplace pose practical concerns to business reputation stemming from the 
“distinctive capacity of the [i]nternet to cause instantaneous and irreparable damage”12. And 
yet, there are different means of protecting business reputation. The interpretation of the 
negative potential effect on business reputation of social media remarks distinguishes 
adjudication within the (largely) private setting of employment
13
 between the countries under 
study. The capture area for perceived negative remarks by workers extends well beyond 
comments made at the workplace on social media and includes statements unrelated to work 
and posted in off duty hours that the employer may find to be embarrassing to its interests. 
While the case law is at an early stage, there is a developing trajectory. In Canada, parameters 
are being developed which point to balancing concerns over business reputation with space 
for workers’ free speech; while UK case law (especially in England) has been more one-
sided, in favor of stricter protection of business reputation, based upon broad contract clauses. 
The more expansive approach to speech in the former jurisdiction establishes that the stricter 
view of important speech in the latter is not the singular means to balance competing 
interests. While the Canadian decisions lead to fertile discussion of pressing social issues, 
they are not idealized. Rulings in both countries remain susceptible to further difficulties, 
such as the capacity for information technology to expose workers and employers alike to 
legal risk beyond the ‘work day’.  
The ensuing pages explore the argument there is a chilling effect on free speech 
stemming from broad contract clauses which ostensibly justify discipline up to and including 
dismissal of workers for a range of remarks made on social media platforms. While 
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9
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10
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11
 Sanchez v Spain (2012) 54 EHRR 24, [57]. 
12
 Barrick Gold Corp v Lopehandia (2004) 71 O.R. (3d) 416 (CA), [44]. 
13
 The reported cases are largely situated within the private setting.  
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protecting commercial interests from negative potential justifiably endures as an important 
objective, there remains room for greater nuance in the application of this rationalization to 
additionally protect a scope for free speech.  
 
II. SOCIAL MEDIA REMARKS INTERSECTING WITH EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Prior to social media, workers would voice their complaints about the workplace in a social 
setting. Remarks, which at one time may have been made in person, are now additionally 
‘posted’ to a social media page and have formed grounds for termination (for example by 
“making disrespectful, damaging and derogatory comments”).14 Employment adjudication 
has acknowledged the appeal of social media platforms: 
 it mimics traditional social interactions. The ability to include or exclude those who can share in 
 the conversation is important. Many subscribers, younger persons, regard Facebook as conduct 
engaged in on personal time, unconnected to the workplace, analogous to sharing a beer with 
colleagues and friends or getting together with friends to confide details about their jobs.
15 
Outside of law, the belief that social media is ‘only’ another medium for private discussion 
remains ubiquitous. What may be a trivial difference to the layperson
16
 is in fact a significant 
distinction within the law. The gap between the lay understanding and legal analysis of social 
media postings by workers may be attributed to the long-held distinction in defamation law 
between libel and slander where the written form has been understood as containing greater 
potential for harm.
17
 The chilling effect on workers’ speech originates in the wide capture 
area of contract clauses (and, if incorporated, workplace policies or handbooks).
18
 
Social media reveals an overlap between tort and employment law. What has been 
taken from defamation are the measurement of harm (to employers’ interests) and, adjunct to 
this measurement, the significance placed on the written form (libel). It is not contended that 
workers are being ‘sued’ in defamation by their employers. Instead, defamation influences 
understanding: workers’ online remarks are treated as constituting harm to business 
reputation. Once the reputational harm has been alleged, the matter becomes subsumed by the 
insubordination rubric: the worker has violated workplace rules. The move is too easily made 
considering the importance placed on free speech in a democratic society. This is all the more 
striking with technological innovations which permit the individual with access to a computer 
and the internet to speak to an audience of her choosing. The present criticism should not be 
viewed as a line of argument requiring employers to accept all online remarks that jeopardize 
business reputation. There are instances when discipline may be at least within a spectrum of 
acceptable responses.
19
 The analysis here considers the disconnect on free speech. There has 
been a selectivity in the defamation principles that are influential; notably when one 
considers the changes in both jurisdictions under study in this tort to permit a broader range 
of expression. The implication is that speech considerations end at the workplace door; a 
separation that is entirely untenable given the persistence of online remarks versus the finite 
nature of a work day. The “infrastructure” of free speech20 in social media has been situated 
in private hands; vesting remarkable authority in employers regarding the assessments of 
comments made on social media.  
This is not the sole dimension to the topic. Social media platforms also use the law to 
                                                 
14
 Lougheed Imports Ltd v UFCW, Local 1518 (2010) C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 186, [56]. 
15
 Groves v Cargojet Holdings Ltd. [2011] C.L.A.D. 257, [77].   
16
 For example, the argument that Twitter comments are akin to a private conversation was rejected in Toronto 
Professional Firefighters Association, Local 3888 v Grievance (Edwards), 2014 CanLII 62879, [178]. 
17
 A history traced in P. Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation (Hart 2005). 
18
 Department for Transport v Sparks [2016] EWCA Civ 360. 
19
 For example, harassment of a worker by a colleague by way of social media was considered in Faires v 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Case No: 2200486/2016. 
20
 J. Balkin, “Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation” (2014) 127 H.L.R. 2296.  
 5 
retain what can amount to editorial control over the speech of users. The power vested in the 
platforms permits them to remove offending comments or even block users. The concept of 
the chilling effect has a lengthy history in defamation law which may be extended here. 
Adding to the considerations, social media platforms constitute a curious contradiction. They 
may be said to chill free speech. They may also be accused of facilitating illegal speech with 
no effective recourse to redress. Additional attention should be drawn to the fact these entities 
are private and as such act within their own defined parameters. Although space does not 
permit further discussion here, this is another aspect of the profound influence of information 
technology.  
There have been movements in both the UK and Canada regarding protecting a wider 
range of free speech in defamation law. Those in Canada,
21
 though, are not as numerous as 
found in its legal ancestor (where most provinces derived their laws from those of the UK, 
save for Quebec which adopted the French civil code). The recent emphasis in the UK on 
defamation law protecting a wider range of speech exposes one of the underlying elements in 
the analysis of social media in the workplace.
22
 The ascendant view is that speech in its 
multifarious forms must be protected, but some level of guardianship over reputation should 
be noted. Criticisms of the tort as a “blot on the lawscape”23 stemmed from protection of 
reputation with protection of liberty, a “surely more important value”.24 Around the turn of 
the 21
st
 century, the tort was under significant change. As the end of the 20
th
 century was in 
view, the House of Lords in AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No.2)
25
 established that 
interference with freedom of expression should only be undertaken where there was a 
pressing social need. This decision was one of the first representing a “rebalancing of the 
law”.26 Lord Nicholls’ words in Reynolds further the point: “To be justified, any curtailment 
of freedom of expression must be convincingly established by a compelling countervailing 
consideration, and the means employed must be proportionate to the end sought to be 
achieved”.27  
Defamation as an action that fits with other torts by compensating for harm has 
become more difficult to reconcile. We recompense when “some other person can be said to 
be responsible for that harm in one of the senses of ‘responsible’ recognized by tort law in its 
heads of liability.”28 Libel, though, has become less about assigning responsibility and more 
about tending a gate through which speech is meant to pass; its movement interfered with in 
particular circumstances. Arguments regarding safeguarding plurality and democratic values 
                                                 
21
 In 2015, the Province of Ontario passed the Protection of Public Participation Act, 2015, S.O. 2015, c. 23 
which, among other parts, amended the Courts of Justice Act to add s.137.1. The purpose of the provision 
(called anti-slapp) includes: “(a) to encourage individuals to express themselves on matters of public interest; 
(b) to promote broad participation in debates on matters of public interest; (c) to discourage the use of litigation 
as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest; and (d) to reduce the risk that 
participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action.”  
22
 It should be borne in mind that much of the movement in this area has been promulgated by the coming into 
force of the Human Rights Act 1998 which brought the European Convention of Human Rights into domestic 
law. 
23
 T. Weir, An Introduction to the Law of Tort 2
nd
 edn (OUP 2006), 190. 
24
 Ibid 176. Plural in original. 
25
 [1990] 1 A.C. 109 (HL). 
26
 A. Mullis & A. Scott, “The swing of the pendulum: reputation, expression and the re-centring English libel 
law” (2012) 63 N.I.L.Q. 27, 29.  
27
 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd. [1999] 3 W.L.R. 1010, 1022. 
28
 P. Cane, “Retribution, Proportionality, and Moral Luck in Tort Law” in P. Cane and J. Stapleton (eds) The 
Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (Oxford 1998), 141. 
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are readily recognizable.
29
 In Chase v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd., the Court of Appeal, 
synthesizing decisions from the European Court of Human Rights,
30
 itemized why free 
speech remains pivotal.31 The distinct treatment is also evident in the discussion relating to 
the prohibition of government (though not individual politicians) to sue in defamation.
32
 The 
basis for this rule is a concern that permitting government to launch this tort action would 
have a chilling effect: it may diminish, if not eliminate, discussion and undercut the notion of 
keeping government accountable to the people. This rationale focuses on what may be called 
the public law aspect as it deals with the interaction between the individual and the state. 
There is a question, then, as to why speech in the private sector speech should be limited in a 
different manner.
33
  
Though free speech is valued in the UK, free press has been the more dominant focus 
of endorsement. This may not quite be understood as the same as free speech insofar as the 
latter term alludes to the individual right and the former a more particular form of the right. 
This distinction seems crucial for the law’s application to the broad forms of communication. 
Social media invigorates the idea of free speech insofar as the individual possesses a platform 
for expression. However, if free speech is viewed as a free press, then the role and influence 
of social media may be significantly truncated. To focus exclusively on free press,
34
 though, 
overlooks the importance placed on free speech to individuals’ self-fulfillment.35 
This is all before we even consider the effect of the defenses. Outside of the US, 
defenses have been expanding in the tort of defamation; premised on the importance of 
speech in democracy. The defenses
36
 are of great importance to the action:
37
 speech may be 
found to be defamatory and still not be the subject of legal sanction because robust defenses 
have been put in place so that speech is protected. The democratic foundations remain pivotal 
even for the private individual; for there is a public interest in the individualized opportunity 
for free speech afforded by social media platforms. The democratic rules outlined in Chase 
require linkage with a democratic culture; that is, the voicing of opinions cannot be kept only 
to the press. The point becomes apparent when considered within the workplace context.  
Once situated within employment law, there is a hardening of when speech rights may 
be recognized. Often the public/private law divide is utilized; those areas in which the state is 
involved and those free from state involvement. Within the UK, the firmness of this 
separation may be challenged, as demonstrated by a host of changes to employment 
                                                 
29
 The European Court of Human Rights in Steel and Morris v UK (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. 22, [87] wrote of free 
speech as “one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its 
progress and for each individual’s self-fulfillment”.   
30
 Jersild v Denmark (1994) 19 E.H.R.R. 26, [31]; Stemsaas v Norway (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 125, [58]-[59]. 
31
 [2002] EWCA 1772, [60]. 
32
 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] A.C. 534 (HL) 
33
 There has been a little-used path for the courts to be involved in enforcing public rights (as enshrined in the 
Human Rights Act, sections 3 and 6) in the private setting: Lord Justice Mummery in X v Y [2004] I.C.R. 1634 
(CA), [64]. See also K.D. Ewing, “The Human Rights Act and Labour Law” (1998) 27 I.L.J. 275 
34
 Paul Wragg has contemplated the distinction between journalists and non-journalists regarding free speech 
arguments: P. Wragg, “‘Free Speech is not Valued if only Valued Speech is Free’: Connolly, Consistency and 
some Article 10 Concerns” (2009) 15 Eur. Pub. L. 111. 
35
 Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 407, [41]; Nilsen and Johnsen v Norway (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 878, [43]; 
Tammer v Estonia (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 43, [59]. 
36
 Where a defendant is “‘confessing’ that the facts narrated by the claimant in his pleadings amounted to a tort 
and alleging further facts that, if true would enable the usual legal effect of the facts pleaded by the claimant to 
be “avoided’”: J. Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (Hart 2013), 2-3. 
37
 Eric Descheemaeker has aptly characterized defamation defenses as “reclaiming much – if not most – of the 
“territory” that the first part of the enquiry [satisfying the tripartite criteria] had handed to the pursuing party”: 
E. Descheemaeker “Mapping Defamation Defences” (2015) 78 M.L.R. 641. 
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regulation aimed at stimulating the economy (in particular increasing private sector hiring)
38
 
where the state has injected itself into private matters of employment. With the emphasis on 
regulation for competitiveness,
39
 employment law has blurred the public/private divide in 
law.
40
 The example of social media in the workplace demonstrates not only the artificiality of 
the divide, but also imports a singular, law-focused perspective.
41
 One element of the 
challenge for social media in the workplace is that the law has difficulty with the dual 
identities of people: an individual has the right of free expression; however, that right is 
limited quite noticeably when one considers that same person as a worker of an employing 
entity.  
A question emerging from the cases discussed below is the legitimacy of employers 
acting as arbiters of speech, though indirectly doing so. The legitimacy of the state (state-
made laws and its courts system to adjudicate) to determine legal issues pertaining to 
cyberspace has been discussed.
42
 In the workplace, however, there has been an absence of 
action. Employers have filled this gap with contract clauses; tools that legitimate subsequent 
disciplinary action (up to and including dismissal). National laws in the common law 
jurisdictions under study (as two examples) have given effect to this means of governing 
relationships. The acceptability of this response is challenged here on the basis that speech 
stands out as an important element of democracy and should not be casually put aside based 
upon a contract clause. As illustrated below, the more flexible approach applied in Canada is 
closer to a balancing of the competing interests. This approach is preferred to an attempt to 
“produce rules which describe as precisely as possible the conduct required from regulates”.43   
The following non-exhaustive categories of sources for online comments posted by 
workers may be discerned: use of an electronic communication device provided by the 
employer; use of the employer’s network (including for personal reasons) regardless of the 
provenance of the accessing device; remarks made about work-related materials where an 
employee uses his/her own electronic device (or that of a non-co-worker); comments by a 
worker on his/her own electronic device or that of a non-co-worker where the subject matter 
may be considered offensive or publicly embarrassing in some manner (even if unconnected 
to the workplace); finally, postings (by either the worker or others) on social media that 
depict the worker in an unsavory manner (perhaps a photograph or video of the individual). 
The dominant view of employers regarding social media is likely that of its business utility 
for public outreach. Many companies have social media pages where they want customers 
                                                 
38
 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Resolving workplace disputes: A consultation (January 
2011); K. Ewing & J. Hendy “Unfair Dismissal Law Changes – Unfair?” (2012) 41 I.L.J. 115; Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, Ending the Employment Relationship: Government Response to Consultation 
(January 2013); Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Employment Law 2013: Progress on Reform 
(March 2013); D. Mangan “No Longer. Not Yet. The Promise of Labour Law” (2015) 26 K.L.J. 129.   
39
 As outlined in H. Collins, “Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness” (2001) 30 I.L.J. 17-47. 
40
 For discussion on the challenges in the area see: G.S. Morris, “The Human Rights Act and the Public/Private 
Divide in Employment Law” (1998) 27 I.L.J. 293 as well as “Fundamental Rights: Exclusion by Agreement?” 
(2001) 30 I.L.J. 49. This is in contrast to the laissez-faire model outlined by Otto Kahn-Freund which 
characterized the time from the 1970s and earlier: P. Davies and M. Freedland, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the 
Law, 3
rd
 edn (Stevens 1983). 
41
 W. Lucy and A. Williams, “Public and private: neither deep nor meaningful?” in K. Barker and D. Jensen 
(eds), Private Law: Key Encounters with Public Law (CUP 2013). 
42
 C. Reed, Making Laws for Cyberspace (OUP 2012). 
43
 Professor Reed has asserted a need for judges to consider the legitimacy of the law’s claim to regulate and 
judges to adjudicate in relation to cyberspace: C. Reed, “Why Judges Need Jurisprudence in Cyberspace” Queen 
Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 244/2016, 4, 10.   
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and workers alike expressing positive views of their products
44
 and workplaces to establish 
an appealing social media presence.  
The issue arising in these cases focuses on the prevalence of internet-based social 
media platforms. This would exclude platforms that operate like a separate text messaging 
system, such as WhatsApp. It is a curious distinction. WhatsApp has been implicated in 
employment litigation, such as in Dixon v T.M. Telford Dairy Ltd.
45
 where at work tensions 
intensified through off-duty social media exchanges on the application. However, the more 
usual platforms are Twitter or Facebook (which also owns WhatsApp). Despite the similar 
messaging capacities amongst media (directed messaging between two parties or setting up a 
group chat), WhatsApp has not been susceptible to the same scrutiny. It may be viewed as 
distinct insofar as texts may not be so easily visible to the world. And yet, these messages 
may be shared just as Facebook or Twitter messages which have been shared with a more 
restricted audience. One difference is that Twitter and Facebook provide a page-based form 
of communication in which the authors of these pages may place individualized comments. 
WhatsApp exists as a text-based application. While it has not been at issue in employment 
litigation, the query remains why WhatsApp may be viewed as distinct from these other 
forms when the adjudication surrounds publishing remarks which employers deem 
embarrassing or harmful to their business reputations.   
There remains the question of whether, in the workplace setting, an employer’s 
endorsement of social media use for business purposes could affect discipline or dismissal. 
The UK cases discussed suggest it may not be the case, but the matter has yet to be 
adjudicated. In Canada, there has been an indication that operating social media accounts 
could place employers in an actionable position where consumers are permitted to make 
discriminatory remarks about personnel or the employer engages in correspondence with 
consumers on matters that are disciplinary in nature and therefore not for public consumption 
pursuant to the collective agreement.
46
 This matter will be returned to later.  
 
III. A STRICT APPROACH TO PROTECTION OF BUSINESS REPUTATION   
UK decisions regarding discipline for remarks on social media contrast with free speech as 
one of the more celebrated rights in western democracies (having garnered special attention 
within the law). Decisions have related to the content of communications (as opposed to 
monitoring of traffic). When looking at electronic communications, cases have arisen as a 
result of disclosure by either a fellow worker or another individual to the employer. The 
paucity of cases of employer monitoring does not suggest that UK employers do not monitor 
their workers’ communications. There are other possibilities for this, including: it may be that 
workers generally do not challenge dismissals where there is monitoring; there is a gradual 
process in workplaces where workers are warned instead of being summarily dismissed.  The 
UK decisions are premised on a (typical) bilateral relationship between worker and employer. 
They reveal unilateral assessments of speech vested in employers by employment contract 
clauses.  
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Recalling the tort law influence on the adjudication of the issue, the UK situation 
remains noteworthy considering there have been lengthy campaigns
47
 leading to government 
pronouncements regarding the good of free speech and subsequent legislative reform, such as 
the Defamation Act 2013. The underlying ethos of these recent reforms has been to expand 
protection for a wider range of speech.
48
 With the remarkable capacities of information 
technology individuals may now easily post comments on any range of matters, not merely 
the political. The various social media platforms (for example) can advance democratic goals 
as well the unsavory agendas. The emphasis here is on better establishing a prima facie space 
for speech. Moreover, the UK cases reveal a strictly construed concept of business reputation 
resulting in a low threshold for discipline (if not dismissal) of workers expressing their 
opinions on social media platforms. The threshold set by the decisions in this area is that of 
speech by workers (though not necessarily related to the workplace) which causes 
embarrassment or a perceived lowering of reputation as determined by employers. UK law 
has demonstrated itself to be capable of greater nuance, and to establish room for (at least) 
the consideration of the co-existence of speech and reputation interests in this setting. It may 
be wondered why in the UK private law tort of defamation law there is some prima facie 
right to free speech, subject to limitations, but the principle does not seem to pierce the walls 
of workplaces, leading to a rhetorical question of why there continues to be a penchant for 
removing the humanity from the one of the most human of legal disciplines, 
labor/employment.  
One must wonder at the permeability of a celebrated right such as free speech when 
considering these employment decisions. In each of the UK cases, a unilateral assessment of 
the impugned speech was made by the employing entity and the final decision carried 
permanent results.
49
 In Smith v Trafford Housing Trust,
50
 the Trust demoted (in lieu of 
termination owing to his many years of service) Smith for expressing his opposition to same 
sex civil marriage on his Facebook page because these postings had contravened the Trust’s 
code of conduct and equal opportunities policy. Smith’s successful wrongful dismissal claim 
was the classic pyric victory; awarded for the twelve weeks before the assumption of his new 
demoted role. His human rights claims were dismissed because his employer was a private 
entity.
51
 Disagreement with Smith’s beliefs aside, the outcome here suggested a punishing of 
Smith’s view based on Trafford’s desire to protect its public identity.52 There is a certain 
level of selectivity here insofar as Smith would have the right to express his position publicly, 
but this freedom was trumped by his status as an employee of Trafford Housing Trust. Smith 
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is not an isolated instance. In Game Retail Ltd v Laws,
53
 Laws used his personal Twitter 
account to monitor Game Retail stores’ Twitter accounts (as part of his position). For a period 
of about a year, he posted (what the employer called) offensive, threatening and obscene 
tweets
54
, which would have been received by those who followed him (a mixture of 
individuals and store staff under his work purview). Agreeing with the employer’s 
characterization,
55
 the Employment Appeals Tribunal observed that Laws failed to create a 
separate personal account. Though easy to admonish Laws for mixing work with personal 
remarks on Twitter, Game Retail left open the possibility of a similar outcome even if Laws 
had maintained two separate accounts and yet made the same impugned remarks.
56
   
The present argument is not one forcing employers to deal with all wayward conduct 
that jeopardizes business reputation. In Crisp v Apple Retail (UK) Ltd.,
57
 for example, the 
claimant was dismissed for posting comments critical of the Apple workplace and its 
products; a matter which Apple had sought to foreclose by the employment contract that 
emphasized the “great importance of image to the company”.58 Unfortunately, the 
employment tribunal’s casual passing over any speech issues dramatized the kind of low 
level treatment that social media speech can receive in adjudication.
59
 The outcome may be a 
matter of enforcing the relevant contract clause to protect commercial interests (and not a 
matter of whistleblowing). The tribunal’s assertion that only political speech would be 
protected, however, asserts a narrow concept. A similar level of skepticism for online 
remarks was evident in Plant v API Microelectronics Ltd.:
60
 “[The Facebook account] was 
linked to family and friends and there was nothing to stop those family and friends 
forwarding those comments open to a wider audience.” Plant imposed a curious 
responsibility upon workers for the passing on of remarks made on social media. Even if 
limited to a specific audience, the ‘speaker’ cedes control of the remark. The concept of 
indefinite liability speaks to the present difficulty. It would be inconsistent for the courts to 
impose what amounts to a form of indefinite liability for remarks on social media in the 
employment setting, especially where these may be the product of autonomous, independent 
action of a recipient to broadcast the comment.  
Combining speech and privacy interests is the surveillance of social media sites on 
which workers in an industry may virtually gather to post comments. A part of the richness in 
this setting is how it offers a contemporary version of workers gathering to talk about their 
workplace or industry, where the distinction between slander and libel becomes influential. 
The brief decision of the employment tribunal in Greenwood v William Hill Organisations 
Ltd.
61
 illustrated. William Hill (a prominent betting agency) employed Greenwood for about 
eleven years (his latest position being Betting Shop Manager). He repeatedly posted 
comments on a Facebook page that was set up for those working in the betting industry 
(apparently called “I no longer fear hell”). His impugned comments (resulting in the 
termination of his employment) included: “Ok – I have been walking a tightrope here – 
media policy – we have had the odd mention of strikes joining unions etc – I suggest smash 
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an FOBT (Fixed Odds Betting Terminal) – most of us have four, why not smash two of them 
all – a large size hammer should do the trick – touch screen is probably the best to damage – 
Luddites unite!!!”62 The comments stemmed from the uncertainty created by company 
restructuring. William Hill’s social media policy warned that serious breaches of the policy 
could result in dismissal for gross misconduct (summary dismissal) and, in particular, noted a 
concern with reputational harm: “We will not tolerate wilful misuse of social media and will 
continue to take a tough stance on this. We must guard against the risk of reputational 
damage or malicious behaviour driven by misuse of social media channels.”63 In response to 
his dismissal for gross misconduct, he contended that the punishment was too severe for 
someone with an otherwise unblemished work record. This was the essence of the case: “The 
real battleground … was whether the sanction was too draconian and that … there is a 
balance to be made between an employee’s right to free speech and the respondent’s right not 
to have the reputation of the company impugned.”64  
Greenwood also revealed a procedural difficulty in English employment adjudication: 
“However, I cannot substitute my views for the views of the dismissing officer. Mr Taylor 
[the dismissing officer] had a situation where the claimant knew the policy had been 
breached, knew that that could be very serious for him if such posts came to … his employers 
notice and that it was a sensitive time commercially for the respondents. The band of 
reasonable responses is very wide.”65 The band of reasonable responses test66 insulates 
employers from penetrating analysis by employment tribunals. Part of the reason for 
characterizing this as a procedural difficulty is the case law outlining the parameters for 
consideration. As noted by the Greenwood Employment Tribunal judge, employment 
tribunals have been cautioned not to substitute their own view for that of the employer.
67
 
Instead, tribunals appear to be more like moderators: the tribunal must assess whether the 
employer genuinely believed the worker’s alleged conduct constituted misconduct and this 
entails consideration of the reasonableness of the employer’s investigation as well as the 
grounds for the employer’s belief.68 The tribunal may only consider whether the employer 
acted as a reasonable employer would have.
69
 This latter point has been the subject of some 
concern, specifically over the “substitution mindset: that an employment tribunal becomes 
sympathetic to the claimant’s cause and is “carried … away from the real question – whether 
the employer acted fairly and reasonably in all the circumstances at the time of the 
dismissal”.70  
Looking to the private setting of employment and its interaction with social media, 
however, it is curious that in the UK there is little room for free speech within the most 
human of collectives, the workforce. The decisions disclose a form of permissible social 
regulation. A coercive authority has been vested in private entities, which carries significant 
potential to narrow the range of speech in general. It also follows an unsophisticated 
methodology of punishing for harm done to the employer where such a claim remains 
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unparticularized. There is a timeliness to this issue insofar as if this situation is not addressed 
now, then the next generation of workers may accede to this standard parameter of work.
71
 
As it stands now, the matter need not be simply accepted. 
 
A. Employers as Gatekeepers 
An outcome of the above cases has been the role of employers as gatekeepers of online 
speech. Without specific legislative prohibition, workers are understood to have consented to 
the broad constraint placed on their social media activity. While this study examines litigated 
circumstances, the fact that the workforce en masse may be subject to this intervention is too 
easily overlooked. The cases that reinforce the potency of contract clauses only compounds 
the already grim situation.  
To illustrate, consider British Waterways Board (t/a Scottish Canals) v Smith
72
 where 
British Waterways applied the following policy in dismissing the claimant: “The following 
activities may expose BW and its employees, agents and contractors to unwarranted risks and 
are therefore disallowed: Any action on the internet which might embarrass or discredit BW 
(including defamation of third parties for example, by posting comments on bulletin boards 
or chat rooms)…”. The EAT affirmed British Waterways’ decision.73 Perhaps most 
importantly as a contribution to the developing understanding of the law in this area, this case 
centered on trust; suggesting that if the employer contends it has lost trust in the worker, 
dismissal will be found to be a reasonable response. Preece v JD Wetherspoon plc
74
 is 
another decision where a worker was terminated (for gross misconduct) based on her use of 
Facebook as a “vent for her upset and anger [one] evening”75 resulting from encounters with 
two customers. Wetherspoon had a broad policy on this subject in its employee handbook: 
“reserved the right to take disciplinary action should the contents of any blog, including 
pages on sites such as MySpace or Facebook ‘be found to lower the reputation of the 
organization, staff or customers and/or contravene the company’s equal opportunity 
policy’”.76 Two customers had subjected Preece to physical threats and verbal abuse during a 
shift. She asked them to leave. Later that evening an individual (allegedly the customers’ 
daughter) made a series of abusive phone calls to her at the workplace. At this point, Preece 
began to comment negatively about the customers on her Facebook page. Other workers 
joined in. Preece had mistakenly thought her privacy settings permitted no more than 60 of 
her friends on Facebook to see these posts. The customers’ daughter saw these postings and 
made a complaint to the respondent. The tribunal upheld the termination. There can be 
differences of opinion regarding these decisions. While these cases may be classified as 
insubordination in some form, it must not be overlooked that these workers were dismissed 
for remarks were ‘published’ on an information technology platform as opposed to being 
stated to co-workers. The publication is the platform for the outcome.  
The potency of employer discipline (up to and including termination) of workers arises 
through indirect effect. Employers act as internet information gatekeepers. This indirect 
effect has been situated within the context of a free and democratic society:  
… the democracy offered online … is the broader notion of facilitation and participation in democratic 
culture, which brings within its ambit cultural participations such as non-political expression, popular 
                                                 
71
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culture and individual participation. Therefore, in assessing the impact on democracy, it is not just 
political discussions that are heralded and protected, but any communication which is part of meaning-
making in democratic culture.
77
 
Employers do not fit easily within the tripartite classification of micro-, authority and macro-
gatekeepers of information. Instead, they possess some of the characteristics of micro- and 
macro-gatekeepers. Like micro-gatekeepers, employers could only affect their workers’ 
conduct. And yet, for those individuals, employers are similar to macro-gatekeepers because 
workers (like users) “must inevitably pass through them to use the internet”.78 The difficulty 
for society emerges in the aggregate: when a plurality of employers act in the same way, the 
scope for speech narrows.  
Viewing employers as gatekeepers challenges the traditional parameters of free 
speech. Aside from the notion of inciting harm, we readily accept that there are limitations as 
to what individuals may write and there seems to be an even more conservative approach to 
speech that may touch on the workplace. Recalling the cases, there is a more permissive 
attitude towards employers disciplining workers for remarks on social media. The possibility 
of losing a job may be one of the most potent of chilling effects. Although there has been no 
pronounced effort by employers to curb workers’ online remarks, speech may be curtailed 
remarkably through the expansive wording of employment contract clauses that confer 
unilateral authority on employers to determine ‘offending’ speech. In effect, this situation is 
indicative of a contemporary version of the historical concept in labor law of the 
master/servant relationship.
79
 
The European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Bărbulescu v Romania80 further 
illustrates the employer as gatekeeper.
81
 While the pleadings in Bărbulescu asserted a 
violation of privacy rights, the majority’s remarks on this topic compel further consideration 
of speech within the workplace. There are two further points from the decision that situate the 
case and ground the ensuing critique. Mr. Bărbulescu was terminated for the personal use of a 
Yahoo Messenger account he had set up for the purpose of clients’ inquiries. During a period 
of a work week, his employer had monitored his account and found that he had exchanged 
messages with his fiancée and brother. The employer had also monitored a personal Yahoo 
Messenger account in which there were exchanges between Bărbulescu and his fiancée. The 
basis of his termination was breach of the company’s internal regulations prohibiting such 
activity, namely the following provision: “It is strictly forbidden to disturb order and 
discipline within the company’s premises and especially … to use computers, photocopiers, 
telephones, telex and fax machines for personal purposes”.82 The employer’s termination was 
upheld at all levels of court, up to and including the Fourth Section of the ECtHR.   
The Grand Chamber overturned the Fourth Section decision. Even with the new result 
at the Grand Chamber, Bărbulescu suggests that at work monitoring may be permissible in 
order to ensure that workers are performing contractual duties. Even in the workplace, there 
is scope for protection of privacy; with an employer being precluded from entirely 
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eliminating private social life from the workplace.
83
 Any conduct of an employer as a data 
controller must be proportionate. As such, the ruling anticipates the consent provisions of the 
GDPR in Article 7.
84
 These points underscore a more procedural guarantee against 
arbitrariness
85
 than a more substantive right which, at first glance, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) may appear to provide. It may also be that where an employer 
has placed a social media policy within the employment contract, then it would form part of 
the performance of the contract. If this is to be the case, it may be wondered whether or not 
the rights outlined within the GDPR are attenuated. It may be that there will need to be made 
a separation of what it is that employers seek; such as monitoring of content of 
communications, duration or volume of data traffic.
86
  
With social media, tort and employment law have converged. Taking more generally 
from the tort idea of censuring harmful conduct,
87
 the UK decisions suggest that workers 
have committed a wrong through their online comments. And yet, defamation operates in a 
manner that is not the orthodox application of tort. If a claimant has met the threefold criteria, 
defamation still permits conduct that qualifies as a tort because it has established (and 
continues to develop) defenses to fit the circumstances. As a result of this distinction, using 
the defamation model would not be a matter of simply transplanting the tort into the 
employment setting.
88
 Rather, there would be a call for nuance. There must be scope for 
employers to protect their business reputations from these comments; for example, when an 
employee uses a social media platform to express discriminatory remarks (a discussion 
undertaken in Canadian labor arbitration decisions). Still, there is an expanse of expression 
before one arrives at these signposts. Here is where the focus of this paper has been: the law 
is a remarkable tool in many ways and there is scope within it to allow for the free expression 
defended in one of its disciplines (tort) to be found in another (employment).   
 
B. Horizontal Direct Effect 
Part of the difficulty with this issue, the law is encumbered when faced with horizontal direct 
effect scenarios; where a public freedom (speech) affects a private commercial entity. As has 
been referenced above, the permeation of these rights has been explored within European 
Union law; notably where there is a positive obligation on member states to secure certain 
rights under domestic law.
89
 There remains a question as to whether this means of 
enforcement will remain part of UK domestic law after departure from the European Union. 
Recent decisions of UK appellate courts have elaborated upon the horizontal direct effect of 
rights. These cases do not necessarily establish a concrete rule. They do set a course for 
further consideration of the topic. In this manner, the decisions line up with the argument that 
there is an overlap between public rights in private law circumstances.  
The Court of Appeal in Benkharbouche & Anor v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan
90 
outlined the horizontal direct effect of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
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European Union (effective remedy for a violation of a right). The court grounded its decision 
in the more recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The UK 
court took note of the CJEU’s decision in Kucukdeveci v Swedex GmbH and Co KG91 which 
found that non-discrimination (here, age discrimination) was a general principle of EU law to 
which effect must be given horizontally. This decision effectively extended the principle 
from Mangold v Helm
92
 to the equivalent Charter provision. However, in CGT (Union 
Association de mediation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT,
93
 the CJEU found that 
workers’ right to information and consultation (Article 27) did not have horizontal direct 
effect without enabling national legislation. Article 47 was distinguished as a provision that 
did not require national legislation to be effective. And so, the question remains “which rights 
and principles contained in the Charter might be capable of having horizontal direct effect 
and which would not”.94 The Benkharbouche Court ruled that Article 47 was “enshrined … 
as a general principle of Union law”95 based upon the aforementioned CJEU decisions 
coupled with explanations accompanying the Charter.
96
 These decisions suggest scope for the 
argument that speech rights permeate the public/private divide. Article 11 (free speech) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union would seem to be one of the general 
principles of EU law (akin to Article 47 in Benkharbouche).  
Despite the UK’s referendum decision to depart from the European Union, free 
speech remains an important right that has garnered persistent attention; for example, the 
efforts to reform defamation law lead to the passage of the Defamation Act 2013 that codified 
(among other points) the common law defenses. The status of certain rights can give effect to 
opportunities for individual development. On that point, the UK Supreme Court in Preddy v 
Bull
97
 (notably Baroness Hale) discussed the concept of rights permeating the private setting. 
The Court unanimously found that the couple (Mr and Mrs Bull) who owned and operated a 
private hotel had discriminated against the same sex couple (Mr Preddy and Mr Hall) by 
refusing them a room with a double-bed. While the Bulls were religious and objected on 
those grounds, Parliament had stepped in “to secure that people of homosexual orientation 
were treated equally with people of heterosexual orientation by those in the business of 
supplying goods, facilities and services”.98 The importance of this measure stems from the 
notion of individual personhood: “[s]exual orientation is a core component of a person’s 
identity”.99 Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy v Information Commissioner100 
suggests that the courts may be willing to use the common law in order to give effect to 
rights. In that decision, the majority discussed the “common law presumption of 
openness”;101 though the dissent’s skepticism should be noted.  
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Gathered together, these appellate level rulings fall short of unequivocal statements on 
future directions. Nevertheless, they do suggest a willingness by UK courts to move in a 
direction of giving effect to rights in both horizontal and vertical manners.  
 
IV. A PERSPECTIVE ON BALANCING BUSINESS REPUTATION AND 
WORKERS’ SPEECH   
Canadian labor arbitration decisions, in comparison, offer less of a strict contractual 
approach. The issue has been treated as embedded within the existing labor law adjudication 
parameters, as opposed to being an overt issue. Generally, employers in these decisions are 
alerted about the content of social media postings by their own workers. The aim in 
discussing the Canadian example, in contrast with the UK caselaw, is to elaborate on the 
critique of the UK decisions by demonstrating that there is a less strict manner in which 
similar objectives (protection of business reputation) may be achieved. This argument also 
underlines that, just as in defamation law, there is no right to a pristine reputation and treating 
it as such in the employment setting does not align well with the expanding scope for 
protection of free speech.   
One example of more nuance rulings is consideration of the settings on social media 
platforms. In Chatham-Kent (Municipality) v CAW-Canada Local 127,
102
 a personal care 
worker created a website (using MSN Spaces) that was accessible to the public (though she 
claimed to have believed the site to be private) containing “resident information and pictures 
without resident consent and … inappropriate comments … about residents entrusted to her 
care”.103 The arbitrator relied upon a number of factors (“her comments, their hostility, and 
the language used to express them”)104 including the widespread accessibility to the public of 
this site to uphold the grievor’s termination. In decisions where Facebook was the platform in 
question, arbitrators have been considering grievors’ privacy settings.105 In Groves v Cargojet 
Holdings Ltd.,
106
 the arbitrator distinguished between Facebook and blogs because the former 
permitted subscribers to limit the audience to which comments were made. Still, Facebook 
settings will not excuse all comments.107  
In Canada, harm to an employer’s reputation is not readily presumed in cases 
involving social media.
108
 While similar to the UK in that the employer need only establish 
the conduct is of such a magnitude that there is potential for detrimental harm to the business 
reputation or to operate the business effectively,
109
 the Canadian decisions tease out 
distinctions not found in the UK cases. This does not appear to be an overt attempt at 
protecting speech. Instead, the matter is subsumed within the existing framework of labor 
arbitration; that is, a determination of the appropriateness of the discipline levied on the 
worker based upon the circumstances has the indirect effect of also touching on the grievor’s 
speech rights. And so, adjudication of discipline for social media speech draws attention to 
                                                                                                                                                        
rights. But the Convention rights represent a threshold protection; and, especially in view of the contribution 
which common lawyers made to the Convention’s inception, they may be expected, at least generally even if not 
always, to reflect and to find their homologue in the common or domestic statute law.” 
102
 (2007), 159 L.A.C. (4
th
) 321. 
103
 Ibid [2]. 
104
 Ibid [31]. 
105
 It should be noted that privacy issues also arise in Canadian employment decisions. Labor arbitrators there 
have recognized some form of privacy for workers dating back some time: Re United Automobile Workers, 
Local 444 and Chrysler Canada (1961), 11 L.A.C. 152; Re Amalgamated Electric Corp. Ltd. (Markham) 
(1974), 6 L.A.C. (2d) 28.   
106
 Groves v Cargojet Holdings Ltd. [2011] C.L.A.D. 257. 
107
 Bell Technical Solutions and CEP (Facebook Postings) (2012) 224 L.A.C. (4
th
) 287, [153].   
108
 Millhaven Fibres Ltd v Oil, Chemical, & Atomic Workers International Union, Local 9-670 (Mattis 
Grievance) [1967] O.L.A.A. No. 4 remains the test where the issue is one of off-duty conduct.  
109
 Toronto District School Board v CUPE Local 4400 (Van Word) (2009) 181 L.A.C. (4th) 49, [65]. 
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the circumstances and context in which the comments were made. Duration of time between 
remarks has been considered. In Canada Post Corp v CUPW,
110
 the grievor posted messages 
to her Facebook page, reaching more than fifty of her Facebook friends, amongst them were 
co-workers, for over a month. These postings “contained a number of derogatory, mocking 
statements about her supervisors and the Corporation”.111 The sustained barrage of remarks 
distinguished this situation from that of one-off venting of frustration.
112
 Comments, which 
may have been ignored if they were spoken, once written online, were recognized as “mean, 
nasty, and highly personal … well beyond general criticism of management and essentially 
target[ed] one person with a degree of venom that is unmatched in other social media 
cases”.113 This was no “momentary lapse” or “short-lived fit of rage”.114 A worker’s written 
attacks aimed at a supervisor (whose identity was alluded to but was not named) using her 
Facebook page can also lead to irreparable damage to the employment relationship. Canada 
Post contributes to this discussion insofar as there is acceptance that workers may 
occasionally act inappropriately but discipline will not always be necessary for a ‘momentary 
lapse’.  
It remains questionable whether a similar stance would be taken in the UK where 
there is rare opportunity given for a worker to render dismissal unfair.
115
 In Creighton v 
Together Housing Association Ltd..
116
 Creighton had amassed over twenty-five years with the 
employer. In the course of an investigation into alleged bullying, the claimant was dismissed 
for gross misconduct based upon derogatory tweets he made about his employer and 
colleagues from three years prior.
117
 The suggestion from the Canadian decisions canvassed 
is that there is leeway for a ‘momentary lapse’. There were no indications Creighton’s tweets 
were over a long period or short-lived. Moreover, Creighton signifies a challenging precedent 
that any negative remarks made at any point in time can form the basis of summary dismissal. 
To some, Creighton may be the correct decision; that is, why should Together Housing 
tolerate these remarks? Recall the statement made earlier in relation to Bărbulescu: try as we 
might, we cannot regulate human foibles out of employment law. Creighton’s tweets were 
uncovered in the course of an investigation into alleged bullying. Perhaps these tweets could 
have suggested another disciplinary matter. To have them stand on their own as the basis for 
dismissal suggests that the workforce as a whole will remain in a tenuous state of 
engagement, pending discovery of some ‘offensive’ remark on social media.  
Discriminatory comments by an employee made to the public at large must be the 
epitome of potential reputational harm for an employer. In Canada, the value of equal 
treatment is enshrined at different levels of law (i.e. the Charter, provincial human rights 
codes). In contrast (and by way of illustration of the divergence of opinion at this fledgling 
stage of the development of a body of jurisprudence), the decision in Wasaya Airways LP v 
Air Line Pilots Assn, International (Wyndels Grievance)
118
 offers a preferable perspective.
119
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The grievor posted a note on his Facebook page that was derogatory towards First Nations 
peoples. Another employee added his own derogatory comments to this posting. Their 
employer’s client base was composed largely of individuals of this denomination. A third 
employee made the employer aware of these posts as she found them offensive. The company 
terminated the grievor’s employment and suspended the other employee who added his own 
comment. Upholding the termination, the arbitrator found there was significant risk the 
comments would harm the employer’s business reputation. 
A further example of online discriminatory remarks crossing the threshold for 
potential reputational harm to a business is City of Toronto v TPFFA, Local 3888 
(Bowman).
120
 The grievor of 2.5 years’ work experience was terminated for off-duty use of 
his Twitter account: “a series of comments on his Twitter account, many of which were 
sexist, misogynist and racist. Some were offensive in their discussion of people with 
disabilities. Others were offensive in their references to homeless people. One invaded the 
privacy of others. Many were jokes, juvenile in nature, with sexual themes”.121 These tweets 
were also published in a report by a national Canadian newspaper alleging an unwelcoming 
culture within the Toronto fire force. While the conduct was considered a breach of City and 
Fire Services policies, the remarkably public manner in which the story arguably harmed the 
reputation of the Service and must be viewed as a key factor in Bowman’s termination. The 
labor arbitration case law confirms both the importance of the employer’s reputation as well 
as its right to protect its reputation with a view to those for whom it provides its service 
where a worker’s off-duty conduct is the topic.122 The fact of public sector employment adds 
to the consideration.
123
 A serious breach of a discrimination policy or the provincial Human 
Rights Code may harm this reputation and justify the employer’s subsequent response. In 
comparison to the UK approach which has permitted discipline for the guilty act alone 
(without other factors being considered), in Bowman, the arbitrator placed weight upon the 
absence of sincerity in the grievor’s apology established by post-incident behavior (such as 
statements to a counsellor) to uphold the termination. Bowman remained oblivious to the 
wrongs committed as he tried to “excuse, minimize and rationalize his conduct”.124 Bowman 
demonstrated how apologies (as noted in McGoldrick
125
) can and have been considerations in 
deliberation of social media issues in the employment setting. From this decision, there was 
implicit acceptance that social media is a platform on which individuals may speak in a 
moment of poor judgement and should not necessarily be punished with the harshest 
                                                                                                                                                        
119
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employment penalty.
126
 The arbitrator concluded the evidence constituted very serious 
misconduct as she upheld Bowman’s termination.  
The companion decision (though from a different arbitrator) of City of Toronto v. 
TPFFA, Local 3888 (Edwards)
127
 arose from overlapping facts insofar as Edwards (a “Black 
Jamaican Canadian male”)128 called out Bowman for a racial slur in one of his tweets. This 
response and some of Edwards’ other tweets were also part of the national newspaper 
coverage forming the departure point for Bowman. Edwards was terminated for breaching 
City and Fire Services policies as well as the harm his conduct caused to the Fire Services’ 
recruitment efforts. The basis for this action were tweets in Edwards’ Twitter account (in 
which he identified himself as a Toronto firefighter): suggesting giving a woman a “swat in 
the back of the head” to “reset the brain” for saying “like” too many times; another tweet in 
which Edwards wrote “go get it sweetie” to a friend and potential female applicant to the Fire 
Services;
129
 and finally the aforementioned tweet in which Edwards repeated a derogatory 
ethnic and racial term in calling out Bowman. The Fire Services emphasized the importance 
of reputation, noting the Standard Operating Guideline (‘SOG’) regarding Public Relations 
which stated at section 2.02: “It is imperative that while in the public eye the Firefighters are 
portrayed in an image that is fitting with the public perception”.130 The arbitrator substituted 
termination with a three-day unpaid suspension.
131
  
There is a mixed texture to Edwards. First, Edwards’ confronting Bowman about his 
racist language remains praiseworthy and certainly played a role in rescinding his 
termination. This exchange draws attention to a positive aspect of social media that is often 
obfuscated by negative examples. Second, however, the use of sexist and violent language 
towards women remains troubling. It certainly attenuates the laudable in these facts. This 
point will be returned to later. Finally, Edwards, as one example, does not do much to draw a 
line between on- and off-duty conduct. It remains advisable for employers to discipline (even 
terminate) for social media usage because the benchmark for reputational harm (anything that 
could reflect poorly on the employer) remains robust. In this way, there appear to be elements 
of a privileged position for employers regarding remarks that may offend; that is, the negative 
effect on business reputation (especially if it can be characterized in some manner such as 
poor recruitment or sales opportunities) affords a fair bit of room within which employers 
may articulate the potential harm of workers’ remarks on social media.  
The firefighter decisions demonstrate how advances in communications technologies 
are associated with societal developments
132
 and the workplace is often where the challenges 
of change are met. With the more nuanced approach in Canada, there has been an opportunity 
to delve into pernicious areas such as the toxic workplace. These decisions were not only 
about a right to free speech but about the power of speech as a means of redress for those 
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marginalized by the remarks. On the power of speech, there remains an equivocal outcome. 
Catherine MacKinnon has pointedly criticized free speech arguments: “Speech theory does 
not disclose or even consider how to deal with power vanquishing powerlessness; it tends to 
transmute this into truth vanquishing falsehood, meaning what power wins becomes 
considered true. Speech, then the lines within which much of life can be lived, belongs to 
those who own it”.133 While MacKinnon wrote of ‘big corporations’, here the argument is 
found in the workplace. Both of the Toronto Fire Services cases suggested a more profound 
potential for social media and adjudication of the cases touching on social inequality. Social 
media platforms may be a mirror to society.  
By publishing offensive comments, authors expose themselves (as demonstrated in 
Edwards) to a corrective response.
134
 Within the context of social change and employment, 
the idea of the toxic workplace comes to the forefront.
135
 On the matters of the power of 
words as well as the potential for social change with respect to inequality, United Steel 
Workers, Local 9548 v Tenaris Algoma Tubes (D Grievance)
136
 illustrates. The male grievor 
posted remarks about a female co-worker’s (though unnamed, he did allude to her identity) 
ability and suggested that she perform a violent and humiliating sexual act.
137
 The remark 
was visible to all who looked at the grievor’s Facebook page. The collective agreement 
stated: “No Harassment or Discrimination … ‘The Company and the Union are committed to 
providing a work environment where all employees are treated with respect and dignity. Each 
individual has the right to an atmosphere which promotes respectful interactions and is free 
from discrimination and harassment’”.138 In the province of Ontario, the amended 
Occupational Health and Safety Act
139
 directly addressed this matter by having “real potential 
to protect the emotional health of workers who are the victims of violence”.140 The 
legislation, as it applies to words, has been interpreted as follows: “The workplace violence is 
the utterance of the words. There need not be evidence of an immediate ability to do physical 
harm. There need not be evidence of intent to do harm. No employee is required, as the 
receiver of the words, to live or work in fear of attack. No employee is required to look over 
their shoulder because they fear that which might follow”.141 As words constituting violence 
(even though not of immediate harm) falling under the purview of the Occupational Health 
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and Safety Act, these remarks on social media platforms carry distinct ground for discipline 
(up to and including dismissal).
142
 Imbuing social issues (such as sexist and misogynistic 
remarks) with legal implications by way of social media speech relating to the workplace 
may be one of the most engaging, controversial and important matters to be taken up by the 
intersection of user-generated content platforms and employment law.  
 
V. CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE 
The Canadian decisions also uncover challenges that remain to be engaged. In this final 
section, two such matters are discussed.  
 
A. Challenge for Employers 
Social media is not exclusively a matter of workers’ speech rights. Commercial entities 
seeking to build up goodwill with consumers through the various media may incur risks in so 
doing. The decision in Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 113 v. Toronto Transit 
Commission (Use of Social Media Grievance)
143
 illustrates the obligations businesses (as 
employers) have to their workers when developing a social media presence. The guidance 
coming from this decision is that a business’ social media presence that is interactive with the 
public would need to also be a space free of “language that is vulgar, offensive, abusive, 
racist, homophobic, sexist, and/or threatening”.144  
The dominant view of employers regarding social media is likely that of its business 
utility for public outreach. The Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) endeavored to utilize the 
medium of Twitter to “clarify, provide additional information, and de-escalate situations”.145 
Based on this objective, it was a novel approach for the TTC to be without a social media 
policy. The existing case law has dealt primarily with the discipline of workers for what they 
have posted on their own social media accounts. @TTChelps involved a practical, though 
foreseeable, question of whether or not an employer’s use of social media for business 
purposes could contribute to a toxic work environment. The arbitrator found the ‘workplace’ 
included the online environment for the purposes of the application of the Human Rights 
Code.
146
 As an example, one witness testified of her anger and embarrassment in being called 
derogatory terms “for all the world to read”.147 
This ruling raised concerns for businesses because it obliged employers (especially 
service-oriented businesses) to police “language that is vulgar, offensive, abusive, racist, 
homophobic, sexist, and/or threatening” because these are remarks may offend relevant 
legislation or contract clauses regarding safe work environments. These steps may seem to be 
onerous to business. Of interest, the criticism of the law would be that employers are being 
placed in the position of regulating speech. And so, the risk/benefit of social media for 
businesses comes full circle. The decision to use social media for business purposes 
reinforces the premise that while employers may discipline workers where comments violate 
contract clauses or workplace policies, employers may also have obligations to their workers.  
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A further challenge approaches in the form of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) which was passed as a regulation of the European Union in 2016
148
 and coming into 
force as of 25 May 2018.
149
 This regulation is the successor to Directive 95/46/EC that was 
adopted in 1995 and came into effect on 25 October 1998.
150
 The GDPR, compared with its 
predecessor, contains enhancements that will pose challenges for the workplace. Notably, the 
GDPR strengthens individual rights by deepening obligations of companies (as data 
controllers) and increasing the sanctions available for national information commissioners. 
GDPR presents a more direct challenge for the workplace than its predecessor. A casual look 
at the GDPR may lead to the conclusion that there is modest change from the 1995 Directive. 
Overall, the Directive established and the Regulation maintains: personal data must be 
processed fairly and lawfully; collected for legitimate and specified reasons; adequate, 
relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which it is collected: accurate, 
where necessary kept up-to-date, and; retained as identifiable data for no longer than 
necessary to serve the purposes for which the data were collected. Though there is not space 
to investigate this Regulation in detail, two brief points are noted. 
In Schrems (Maximilian) v Data Protection Commissioner,
151
 the CJEU reinforced 
the importance of substantial similarity between EU data protection regulation and third-party 
countries that trade with the EU. With regards to the challenge of adequacy (substantial 
similarity) that third party countries will face, Bruno Gencarelli, Head of the Data Protection 
Unit at the European Commission, has spoken about the adequacy regime for third 
countries.
152
 He stated: “Adequacy is not about being a photocopy.” For him, the effective 
implementation of privacy rights requires a foreign system to deliver similar protection; what 
was called “essential equivalence”. Gencarelli seemed to admit to a certain level of 
fluctuation in the term adequacy. He commented: “Adequacy is a finding at a certain point in 
time. A country can evolve. An adequacy decision is a living document and must be 
monitored.” The elements considered in a ruling regarding adequacy can be found through 
the work of the Article 29 Working Party. As well, Art. 45 of the GDPR contains a detailed 
list of items to be considered. An emphasis was placed upon equivalence not meaning 
symmetrical or a point to point duplication. Rather, it was suggested the key principles of the 
GDPR must be addressed; but protection can be reached by different means.  
Aside from the substantial similarity requirement, employers have relied upon the 
employment contract for consent to a range of matters. The GDPR places this type of consent 
in question. Article 7(2) states: “If the data subject's consent is given in the context of a 
written declaration which also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be 
presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an 
intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language.”153 Based on this 
provision, an employer would likely need to draw the worker’s attention specifically to a 
distinct part of the contract that deals with personal data processing. And yet, there is a 
further consideration. Article 7(4) states: “When assessing whether consent is freely given, 
utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including 
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the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is 
not necessary for the performance of that contract.” This provision appears to contemplate an 
employment situation in which a job offer is made by way of a standard form contract on a 
‘take it or leave it’ basis. The battleground may be (in the scenario where an employer wishes 
to monitor social media activity) whether or not the processing is necessary for the 
performance of the employment contract. The employer would argue that there must be the 
capacity to determine whether or not workers are adhering to contractual obligations. In 
addition, there can be a security dimension: are workers adhering workplace IT security 
protocols and/or conducting themselves in a way that does not breach information security? 
These could both be viewed as aspects of the performance of the employment contract. 
Bărbulescu suggests that at work monitoring may be permissible in order to ensure that 
workers are performing contractual duties. It may also be that where an employer has placed 
a social media policy within the employment contract, then it would form part of the 
performance of the contract. If this is to be the case, it may be wondered whether or not the 
rights outlined within the GDPR are attenuated. It may be that there will need to be made a 
separation of what it is that employers seek; such as monitoring of content of 
communications, duration or volume of data traffic.
154
  
B. Challenge for Workers 
Despite the remarkable scope of social media for connection and speech, workers must 
remain aware of the associated perils. Foremost, while the Canadian decisions offer greater 
scope for online remarks without necessarily drawing workplace discipline, it should be 
noted that contract clauses (or workplace policies that have contractual effect) remain potent 
tools for employers. Targeting adjudicators of these employment cases, the above argument 
outlines that there should be scope for online speech without necessarily triggering workplace 
discipline, but this does not exclude such a response. Employers may assess the best course 
of action to be discipline. It should also be noted that the referenced Canadian decisions all 
involved unionized workplaces. The non-unionized worker is more vulnerable in this regard.   
Additionally, there may be occasion when the particular position of the worker places 
him/her in a situation in which greater care must be taken with online remarks. The point was 
passingly referred to in the UK decision of Game Retail and the Canadian firefighters cases. 
A more explicit example comes from a decision of the Leuven Labor Tribunal
155
 which 
upheld a dismissal where the critical statements of a business development manager
156
 on his 
Facebook account constituted serious misconduct warranting dismissal. Aside from the 
company’s communications policy, his work as a manager coupled with the timing of the 
comments (around the time when the CEO had been reassuring markets about the company’s 
strength) factored into upholding his dismissal. 
Perhaps one of the more unsettling aspects of the capacities with information 
technology is that, unlike a workday, a posting on social media remains online regardless of 
the time of day. This means that a posting made outside of work time may lead to workplace 
discipline. A point of convergence is that the online presence of a company as well as a 
worker transcends the workday. The @TTChelps decision demonstrated. Racist, sexist or 
homophobic remarks posted to the TTC’s twitter account existed in a permanent form; unless 
and until TTC personnel took them down. The notion of time again arises. There can be a 
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distinction between a one-off or short period of questionable postings as compared to 
sustained postings over a longer duration. Here, the length of time the posting was publicly 
visible may also affect the sustainability and/or outcome of a claim. Regardless of duration, a 
posting on social media made at home or at work may equally expose the worker to employer 
discipline. Furthermore, there appears to be no limitation period for a posting to give rise to 
such discipline. The implication is that postings from a time pre-dating current employment 
may form the basis of proceedings at a later date; even giving rise to a matter of opinion 
between two employers where one employer takes disciplinary action for a remark that a 
prior employer did not deem troublesome. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In contrast to Canada, speech of workers on social media platforms garners noticeably less 
protection in the UK. The matter is made stark by the disconnect between these decisions and 
recent legislative and common law movement regarding UK defamation law. The potential 
for an employer to dismiss (coupled with case law vindicating the decision) has a deterrent 
effect on speech in general as it contrasts unfavorably with the protection that guides libel 
adjudication. While workers’ speech on social media is the subject of legitimate concerns 
over business interests, this matter alone should not easily displace the prima facie right to 
free expression.   
The distance in protection of speech for workers versus media must be critically 
engaged. It is a troubling distinction when the law protects in the tort of defamation writing 
about a range of matters when a worker’s remarks may also fit under the same heading. There 
should be more robust scope for a worker to speak. As it stands, there appear to be limitations 
not in concert with defamation law. The underlying difficulty is the categorization of social 
media as a lower form of speech; an intimation mainstream media is at a higher level that is 
worthy of protection. Social media may be an equivocal development because it dramatizes 
the positive and negative of human interaction. And yet, its very mixed nature may be a tool 
for societal development. 
